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will continue to thrive as long as auditing involves service 
rendering. Nonetheless, it has been observed that there 
is no one generally accepted definition for this complex 
concept that has generated strands of discourse in the li-
terature (International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board (IAASB) 2011). 
DeAngelo (1981) in a bid to provide an understanding 
of this concept gave a widely used definition of audit qual-
ity as the combination of two probabilities. The first being 
that an auditor in the course of investigating will discover a 
material problem with a client’s accounting system and he 
is also expected to make known or disclose such problem 
as an auditor. This reveals that this complex concept may 
be disintegrated into two simple areas: a discovering aspect 
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Introduction
Literature on audit quality is increasing as the time goes 
by. The reason for this may be hinged on the importance 
attached to it. After the initial work of DeAngelo in 1981 
on auditor size and audit quality, there has been pletho-
ra of studies all seeking to add to the body of knowledge 
on the subject matter. One justification for the increasing 
studies on audit quality globally may be adduced to the 
“service nature” of auditing. Auditing involves the attesta-
tion of accounting information and provision of reasonable 
assurance to the users of accounting information by an 
independent party (Enofe et al. 2013b). This role is not 
tangible, as such, it is a service, and one of the hallmarks of 
good service is quality. Consequently, the issue of quality 
and a reporting aspect. Once the first aspect is experienced, 
the second must follow for audit quality to be achieved. 
Chadegani (2011) noted that Palmrose’s definition of audit 
quality has also been widely used as it relates audit quality to 
the level of assurance, knowing fully well that auditing as a 
service is meant to provide reasonable assurance. Looking 
at these definitions and others as provided in prior studies, 
this study prescribe that an important driver or criteria of 
audit quality is the capability of the auditor. For an auditor to 
discover a violation of the accounting system or a misstate-
ment in the financial statement, he must be qualified and 
capable. More so, for an auditor to report on financial issues, 
he must also be capable (integrity and independence). Thus, 
an unqualified auditor or an incapable auditor cannot serve 
the meal of audit quality to users of accounting information. 
In other words, the study believes that evaluating audit qual-
ity requires an evaluation of the capability of the auditor. 
The increasing arguments as it relates to audit quality 
have been adduced to the negative publicity that has sur-
rounded the services provided by the auditor. Such negative 
publicities are seen from the experiences of corporate scan-
dals witnessed globally. Specifically, companies and coun-
tries that have a fair share of the negative publicities associ-
ated with the level of audit (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Dynegy, 
Adelphia, Tyco (United States); WorldCom, Pamalat 
(Italy); Carrian Group (Hong Kong); HIH Insurance, 
OneTel (Australia), Savannah bank, Societe General Bank, 
Intercontinental Bank, Oceanic Bank, Cadbury (Nigeria) 
(Odia and Ogiedu 2013, Uwuigbe 2011, Uwuigbe et al. 
2017). In fact, Mgbame, Eragbhe, and Osazuwa (2012) re-
iterated that the continued discourse on audit quality is 
because of the global financial reporting scandals that seem 
to be a recurring decimal and has largely affected the percep-
tion and reception of accounting information users to the 
services rendered by both the accountant and the auditor. In 
a bid to provide an antidote to the plague of negative public-
ity and loss of positive perception of accountants, auditors 
and even the business world, corporate governance has been 
fingered (Uwuigbe et al. 2016a, Demaki 2011, IAASB 2011, 
Okolie 2014). The IAASB (2011) asserted that corporate 
governance, which is a contextual factor, is one of the three 
(3) important group-factor that affect audit quality. Others 
are the input group (e.g. auditing standard) and the output 
group (e.g audit report). Okolie (2014) claimed that cor-
porate governance is simply the manner corporations are 
managed and runned. If they are managed well, this will 
rub off on audit quality and cause an improvement. Demaki 
(2011) opined that this expected positive effect of corpo-
rate governance on quality that has caused the Nigerian 
regulatory environment to come up with different codes of 
corporate governance. Specifically, the 2003 Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) Code as amended by the 2011 
SEC code which is presently under review. Other codes 
include: 2006 Central Bank of Nigeria Code of Corporate 
Governance for Banks; 2008 National Pension Commission 
(PENCOM) Code of Corporate Governance for Licensed 
Pension Operators; 2009 National Insurance Commission 
Code of Good Corporate Governance for the Insurance 
Industry (Okolie 2014).
Apart from the Companies and Allied Matters Act (2004 
as amended) that provides for the establishment of the audit 
committee (one out of the numerous mechanism for cor-
porate governance), the 2003 SEC code, and subsequent 
codes provides rules and standards on the establishment, 
composition, and operations of this committee. According 
to Ilaboya (2005), standards are principles of best practices. 
They specify benchmark requirements that should be fol-
lowed. As regards the operations of audit committees in 
Nigeria, the various codes of governance are likened to 
standards that prescribe how the audit committee should 
be established and operated. CAMA, 1990. S. 359) (3) 
prescribes that all public companies must have an audit 
committee which is to serve as a mechanism to promote 
quality report and reporting. It went further to state that 
the committee should have an equal number of directors 
and representatives of shareholders subject to a ceiling of 
six persons. Similarly, the 2011 SEC code specifies that at 
least one member of this committee must be a financial 
literate and should be able to read and understand the an-
nual report. Although not related to the audit committee, 
the same code specifies that the board of directors should 
meet at least every quarter to carry out its responsibilities. 
Consequently, if the audit committee is seen as an extension 
of the board, as a mechanism of corporate governance just 
like the board, we may argue that the same duty for meet-
ings can be drawn from the expectations for the board of 
directors. In all, these requirements, principles, or rules are 
benchmarks prescribed by the regulatory environment to 
aid audit quality. However, are these prescriptions based 
on theoretical underpinnings, casual empirics or merely a 
bandwagon phenomenon that characterize most develop-
ing nations? 
The resource need for a member with financial experi-
ence in the committee to aid effectiveness and the need 
for information symmetry as well as protection of stake-
holders are supported by theories like the agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, and even the resource dependence 
theory. However, these theories do not state a benchmark. 
Furthermore, the theory of critical mass supports the claim 
that a minimum number is required to cause a chain re-
action or at least, cause a positive and significant impact. 
Though, it doesn’t state what that minimum number should 
be. Therefore, what informed these specific benchmarks 
seen in our Nigerian codes and how do they affect the abil-
ity of audit committees to effectively ensure audit quality? 
These may serve as justification for this study. Thus, this 
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study seeks to empirically investigate the benchmarks on 
audit committee attributes and how they affect audit quality. 
The study follows a deductive approach and an expo facto 
research design. It focuses on just public companies listed 
on the Nigerian Stock Exchange as they are mandated to 
have audit committees. It also looks at the period subse-
quent to the introduction of the 2011 SEC code since is it 
the most recent and major code of corporate governance in 
operation in Nigeria. The rest of this paper is divided into 
sections. The next section is on the issue of audit quality or 
quality of audit. 
Audit quality or quality of audit?
Do these two mean the same? It was observed that 
DeAngelo (1981) used these two words (audit quality or 
quality of audit) interchangeably. In some part of her stu-
dy, she explains the combined probability of discovering 
and reporting a violation in the accounting system as audit 
quality and in some other part; she referred to it as quality 
of audit services. Was this a mistake or premeditated? She 
relied on the simplest form of the input, process and output 
theory in providing her definition. Her argument based 
on this assumption is that auditing service is demanded 
by shareholders to help address the agency conflict. Thus, 
as an input, the auditor brings the resources (knowledge, 
time, skill, competence, independence, perception and ot-
hers) to carry out the process (investigate, sample, verify, 
discover, audit environment, and others) which then leads 
to an output (report, opinion). If the auditor brings the right 
input to the process, the right output should result and 
thus, audit quality/quality of audit but if not, the reverse 
is the case. However, Duff (2004) opined that DeAngelo’s 
definition is partial in approach as it focuses on just the 
technical aspect. In other words, if an auditor is technically 
competent, he opined that based on the definition provided, 
it should be audit quality not necessarily quality of audit. 
Duff (2004) argument for this difference is based on what 
is been focused. If the focus is just the output (opinion and 
report), then it is an issue of audit quality but if the focus is 
on the process (nature of the service rendered, how it was 
rendered), it is an issue of quality of audit, something he 
also termed service quality. 
Figure 1 above is a diagrammatic representation of Duff 
(2004) idea of quality of audit. When auditing is scrutinized 
under the magnifying glass of the processes involved, then 
the concept of quality of audit comes to bear however, when 
it is scrutinized under the magnifying glass of just the output 
(as seen in Figure 2), then the concept that is readily seen 
is that of audit quality. 
Thus, in trying to marry these two concepts, this study 
opines that they are not necessarily different; rather, it is 
dependent on the angle from which auditing as a service is 
viewed. It is observed that most literature focuses on audit 
quality rather than quality of audit. The reason is quite 
simple, as it is difficult to measure and quantify the process 
involved in auditing, and the information to do so is not 
readily available unlike the output, which can easily be seen. 
Hence, this study will basically focus on audit quality. 
Furthermore, a related issue to the above is evaluating 
audit quality. How can audit quality be judged? Sutton and 
Lampe (1990) in a study involving the survey of practising 
auditors, evaluated audit quality with a model that captured 
19 attributes of audit quality which they grouped broadly 
into planning, fieldwork and administrative attributes. In 
a similar manner, Beattie and Fearnley (1995) in their sur-
vey of attributes of auditors that account for quality audit, 
grouped the various attributes found into 5 groups vis audit 
firm integrity, audit firm reputation, professional and tech-
nical competence of audit firm, professional competence, 
skills and duty of care of the audit partners, and the quality 
of work relationship among the partners and within the 
firm. Duff (2004) opines that the manner the audit is carried 
out should be the basis for judging audit quality. Likewise, 
DeAngelo (1981) who already documents that the capability 
of an auditor to discover and also report a material problem 
with a client’s accounting system is the basis for judging 
audit quality. Yuniarti (2011) suggests 7 characteristics by 
which audit quality can be evaluated (significance, reliabil-
ity, objectivity, scope, timeliness, clarity, and efficiency). 
All these seem to relate more with the auditor and audit 
firms providing audit services. Furthermore, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC 2006) in its paper prescribe that 
the evaluation of audit quality be done in consideration 
of the culture of the audit firm, the professional skills and 
qualities of the employees of the audit firms (partners and 
other staff), the audit process just to mention a few. It is ob-
servable that premium was placed more on non-exogenous 
factors related to the auditor. 
All these provide a platform that supports the idea that 
audit quality may chiefly be evaluated by considering more 
of the attributes and capability of the service provider. This 
study’ evaluation of audit quality, therefore, aligns with 
DeAngelo (1981) and Aronmwan et al. (2013) and assert 
Figure 1. Quality of Audit
Figure 2. Audit Quality 
Source: Researchers (2016)
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that audit quality can be evaluated based on the “capability” 
of the auditor and because this is a multifaceted concept 
that can be very difficult to measure; based on the product 
differentiation hypothesis (Simunic 1980), this attribute is 
captured using audit firm size (Big 4 and Non-Big 4). 
Measures of audit quality
Due to the complex nature of audit quality as noted by 
IAASB (2011), and the difficulty in measuring actual audit 
quality as noted in Dang (2004); there are various measures 
used in prior literature to capture the concept (Chadegani 
2011). These measures according to Chadegani (2011: 2) 
include direct measures such as “financial reporting com-
pliance with GAAP, quality control review, bankruptcy, 
desk review and SEC performance” and the indirect mea-
sures include “audit size, auditor tenure, industry expertise, 
audit fees, economic dependence, reputation and cost of 
capital” (Chadegani 2011: 2). Chadegani (2011) further 
opined that the use of direct measures is not common and 
it is quite challenging. The major challenge stems from 
the difficulty in getting data due to its private ownership 
hence, the popularity of the indirect measures. However, 
Dang (2004) in a related study argued that the measures 
of audit quality may not capture actual audit quality and 
at best, would capture perceived audit quality. The reason 
provided stems from DeAngelo (1981) definition of audit 
quality. DeAngelo (1981) in his definition describes audit 
quality as the “market assessed probability”. This means that 
the assessment is based on a third party (market/public) 
who is not privy to actual audit process. Thus, what they 
assess at best is what they perceive and this perception is 
based on measures or proxies. Therefore, since audit qu-
ality cannot be easily observed, measures used must be a 
near and valid proxy to ensure reliability. Some of the most 
commonly used proxies include: auditor size (DeAngelo 
1981, Zureigat 2011), audit fees (Aronmwan et al. 2013, 
Yuniarti 2011), auditor industry specialization (Abbott and 
Parker 2000, Jiang et al. n.d.), accruals quality (Kallapur et 
al. 2008, Lawrence et al. 2011). However, Chadegani (2011) 
and Dang (2004) opined that auditor size is the most com-
monly used proxy for audit quality.
Concept of Audit committee
The popularity of this concept in literature can be traced 
to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), who in 1967 recommended the establishment 
of audit committee boards in order to assist with re-
porting process. More so, bodies such as the Tread Way 
Commission, Blue Ribbon committees, US Security and 
Exchange Commission, cannot be left out in the dis-
course on the development of audit committees (Blue 
Ribbon Committee 1999, Treadway Commission 1987). 
According to Abbott, Parker and Peters (2002) and Lin, Li 
and Yang (2006), the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee of 1999 was aimed at strengthening the effecti-
veness of audit committees (AC) as it relates to quality 
reporting and since then, studies have emerged that try to 
investigate the effectiveness of audit committees. Enofe, 
Aronmwan and Abadua (2013a) also noted that the his-
toric development of audit committees can be seen from 
two broad periods: a period of obligatory establishment 
of audit committees (before 1978) and a period of man-
datory establishment (after 1978). Audit committee can 
be described as a corporate governance mechanism (Li et 
al. 2012), an arm of the board of directors (Dhaliwa et al. 
2006), saddled with responsibility of ensuring quality re-
porting by performing oversight functions of the activities 
of management and external auditors (Enofe et al. 2013a) 
as well as help mitigate the agency problem between ma-
nagement and owners. Nnadi (1999) describes it as (audit 
committee) a company committee that should foster the 
independence of the external auditor. Thus, the presence 
of the audit committee should engender quality and inde-
pendent reporting. The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 defines 
it as a committee established by the board of directors to 
oversee the processes involved in accounting and auditing 
of company financials. According to Li et al. (2012), the 
audit committee can be used as an effective tool to ensure 
quality-reporting process. However, if this must be achie-
ved, audit committees must possess some characteristics 
such as independence, frequent meetings, and financial 
expert as resource persons (Li et al. 2012). 
Audit committee size and Audit quality
By audit committee size, in the context of this study is des-
cribed as the number of persons that make up the com-
mittee. Regulatory bodies such as the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (2004 as amended) and the Security 
and Exchange Commission code of corporate governance 
of 2011 have specified the number of persons that should 
be on the audit committee board. Specifically, the Act sti-
pulates that audit committees must be six (6) in number 
and should be made up of equal numbers of directors 
and shareholders representatives S359 (4). For a commit-
tee to function properly, it is expected to have adequate 
manpower hence, the size criteria. Several studies such 
as (Olubukunola et al. 2016, Uwuigbe et al. 2016b, Jensen 
1993, Bedard et al. 2004, Yermack 1996; etc.) have examined 
the relationship between the size of audit committees and 
audit quality. According to Jensen (1993), the audit com-
mittee monitoring oversight functions is better for com-
panies with small-sized audit committee. The justification 
for this is that small boards allow for easy communication 
and thus, little bottlenecks in decision-making but Bedard, 
Chtourou and Courtea (2004) disagreed and argued that 
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a large-sized audit committee would have better control 
and oversight function which would translate to improved 
audit quality as a result of having more hands to work. 
Lin et al. (2006) observed that a committee with at least 4 
members has a significant negative relationship with ear-
nings restatement. In the same vein, Yermack (1996) in a 
related study opined that a small board size vary directly 
with firm value. However, what number defines a small 
board is unknown and relative.
However, a thorough analysis from a theoretical point 
of view, the theory of critical mass as stated earlier supports 
the claim that a minimum number (persons in this case) 
is required to cause a chain reaction (audit quality, in this 
case). Thus, the theory did not provide any criteria to deter-
mine what that number is. Therefore, if regulations specify a 
particular number, what informed this and what will be the 
expected outcome? It is noted that this size criteria differs 
across countries. For example, while in Nigeria, a specific 
number (6) is expected, in the US, Lin et al. (2006) noted 
that the US SEC specified a minimum of 4 members while 
in the UK, a minimum of 3 members is specified. Thus, 
will the findings from these countries be different? Hence, 
based on the Nigerian context or environment, this study 
hypothesized that: 
H1: There is a significant relationship between the size 
benchmark for Audit committees in Nigeria and audit quality.
Audit committee meetings and Audit quality
With respect to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee, Audit committees are expected to meet regu-
larly in order to be effective in the discharge of its oversight 
functions (Abbott et al. 2002). Casual empirics suggests 
that a group or committee that meets regularly is expected 
to outperform a group or committee that does not, since 
it is expected to have more time to deliberate and take de-
cisions. Bryan, Liv, and Tiras (2004) as cited in Madawaki 
and Amran (2013) observed that companies with audit 
committees that meet regularly experienced improved 
quality because of better transparency in reporting. They 
also found out that those audit committees that regularly 
meet are able to perform monitoring tasks more effectively 
than audit committees that are irregular in meeting. They 
recommended that such meetings should not be reacti-
ve in nature but proactive if it must be termed effective. 
Similarly, casual empirics suggested that committee mee-
tings should be complementary to size criteria. That is, if 
audit committee size is small (in size), they would require 
more time to meet so as to do what probably a large sized 
committee would do in less time. Blue Ribbon Committee 
(BRC) specifically stated that audit committees should meet 
at least quarterly and this they argued shows the level of 
diligence expected from audit committees. Stewart and 
Munro (2007) using an experimental design, observed that 
respondents align to the perception that audit committee 
meeting; a proxy for the diligence and activity of the AC 
should be within 2 to 6 times in a year. Specifically, they 
believe that meeting just twice in a year is too infrequent to 
allow for effectiveness and meeting about 6 times in a year 
is too frequent and would be cost ineffective. Thus, they 
advocated for a midpoint of 4 times in a year. According 
to Xie, Davison and DaDalt (2003), an indirect relations-
hip exists between the number of committee meetings and 
the levels of earnings management. Salawu, Okpanachi, 
Yahaya, and Dikki (2017) found a positive and insignificant 
relationship between audit committee meetings and audit 
quality. However, Bedard, Chtourou, and Courtteau (2004) 
did not find any positive association between frequency of 
audit committee meetings and financial reporting quality. 
In Nigeria, there are no regulations that are specific as to 
the number of meetings but this study opine that since 
2011 SEC code require that the board of directors should 
meet at least every quarter to carry out its responsibilities. 
Consequently, if the audit committee is seen as an extension 
of the board, as a mechanism of corporate governance just 
like the board, we may argue that the same duty for mee-
tings can be drawn from the expectations for the board of 
directors. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that:
H2: There is a significant relationship between the meeting 
benchmark for Audit committees in Nigeria and audit quality.
Audit committee financial expertise and Audit quality
Unlike the size criteria that was specified by CAMA (2004), 
the expertise criteria was specified in Nigeria by the 2011 
SEC Code, 2006 Post consolidation CBN code amongst 
other codes. These codes specify that at least, a member of 
the audit committee must possess financial management 
and accounting knowledge. The US SEC also has a similar 
condition as it expects that firms must have at least one per-
son with financial expertise. Juhmani (2017), asserted that 
the availability of an accounting and financial knowledge 
in the audit committee would enhance its efficiency and its 
ability in detecting and preventing earnings management. 
Kibiyaa, Ahmada and Amran (2016) also buttressed in their 
study that the presence of a member with financial literacy 
or knowledgeable in accounting, finance or financial ma-
nagement will enhance the quality of the financial report. 
However, Dhaliwal et al. (2006) noted that the expertise 
criterion given is broad in terms of definition. They claim 
that persons with financial expertise can mean any of the 
following (1) certified public accountant, auditor, financial 
officers, or controllers (2) anyone that has worked in a su-
pervisory role that involves financial statement preparation. 
Thus, expertise can be technical or supervisory in nature 
but the contention is that which of this nature of expertise 
is fundamental to audit quality? Is it technical/accounting 
or supervisory/financial management? Livingston (2003) 
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provides evidence that supervisory expertise does not 
translate to effective understanding of accounting issues 
and may not ensure audit quality. This is buttressed by 
Dhaliwal et al. (2006) who investigated various types of 
expertise against audit quality and found that only accoun-
ting expertise had a significant effect on audit quality. 
Aronmwan et al. (2013) in their study on audit firm repu-
tation and audit quality, controlled for audit quality using 
audit committee financial expertise as captured using the 
number of members with accounting expertise. They found 
an insignificant but positive relationship with audit quality. 
Similarly, Salawu et al. (2017) and Omoye and Aronmwan 
(2013) also documented an insignificant positive relations-
hip between audit committee expertise and audit quality. 
In their study, expertise was captured using proportion of 
members with financial and accounting experience to the 
total board membership. Li et al. (2012) argued that audit 
committees having members with requisite financial exper-
tise are in a better position to have knowledge of capital 
market implications of decisions and disclosures in finan-
cial statement. Such disclosures are expected to improve 
reporting quality and reduce information asymmetry on 
firm’s value. Thus, based on the expectation of the codes 
of corporate governance in Nigeria specifying that at least 
one person must be able to read and interpret the financial 
statement, this study hypothesize that:
H3: There is a significant relationship between the exper-
tise benchmark for Audit committees in Nigeria and audit 
quality.
Audit committee effectiveness and Audit quality
Prior to the BRC recommendation, the issue on audit com-
mittee was about their effectiveness. Hence, the essence of 
the recommendations was to strengthen and ensure au-
dit committee effectiveness (Lin et al. 2006). Dezoort and 
Salterio (2001) affirm that the construct of audit committee 
effectiveness is multidimensional and is affected by the 
various audit committee characteristics. Pucheta-Martinez 
and Cristina de Fuentes (2007) opined that researches on 
audit committee effectiveness have mostly focused on 
three variables viz size, nature of members and meetings 
of the committee. Krishnan (2005) opined that for an au-
dit committee to be termed effective, then emphasis must 
be placed on its composition and diligence. In the words 
of Owolabi and Dada (2011), the essential attributes of 
an effective audit committee are seen from the extent to 
which its members are independent in their duties, and 
experienced on technical/financial matters as it may relate 
to reporting. Furthermore, Habbash (2010) suggest that 
audit committee characteristics, such as independence, 
expertise, and diligence are the very important factors that 
contribute to the effectiveness of audit committees. Based 
on these, it is obvious that there is no general agreement 
as to what attributes make up an effective audit commit-
tee but we may infer based on the BRC report and other 
corporate governance code that a committee that meets 
all the requirements as specified by the various regulation 
may be termed effective and therefore, ensure audit quality. 
Thus, effectiveness should be measured along a continuum 
of less effective (having just one attribute) to most effective 
(having all the attributes). In this regards, this study hy-
pothesize that:
H4: There is a significant relationship between the audit 
committee effectiveness and audit quality.
1. Analytical framework and method
This study adopts a positivism research philosophy as it 
seeks to make deductions and generalizations from data 
gathered from secondary source (annual reports of com-
panies) and strongly believe that these data are free from 
human subjectivity and bias. Furthermore, this deductive 
study applies the expost-facto research design that observes 
events (activities of companies as reduced to figures) after 
they have occurred (reporting year). The reporting years 
under consideration are 2012 to 2014 and a combination of 
convenience and simple random sampling techniques have 
been utilized to arrive at a sample of 50 companies from 
the 194 companies listed on the Exchange as at 31st Dec. 
2014 thus, forming a 150 firm-year observation. 
The analytical framework for this study is based on 
the agency theory, resource dependence theory and the 
theory of critical mass. The agency theory advocates that 
the separation of ownership from management results in 
a principal-agent crisis (Jensen and Meckling 1976). One 
way the crisis may occur is via information asymmetry. 
Therefore, to solve this, corporate governance mechanism 
(e.g. audit committee) should be set up to help with the qual-
ity of information been presented to the owners of business 
(Enofe et al. 2013a). Thus we expect that audit quality will 
be dependent on the presence of audit committees.
 AQUAL = f(AUDCOM). (1)
According to Li et al. (2012), the audit committee can be 
used as an effective tool to ensure quality-reporting process. 
However, if this must be achieved, audit committees 
must possess some characteristics. They include indepen-
dence, frequent meetings, and financial expert as resource 
persons. Thus, in line with the resource dependence theory, 
if the audit committee must be effective in its duties and re-
sponsibilities, it must be well equipped in terms of resources 
(human, knowledge, time). Hence, 
 AQUAL = f(ACSIZE, ACMT, CEXP);  (2)
 AQUAL = f(ACE, FT). (3)
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The theory of critical mass infers that that a minimum 
number (e.g. persons or meetings or experts) is required to 
cause a chain reaction (audit quality). Furthermore, CAMA 
1990 S. 359(3) prescribe that all public companies must have 
an audit committee having equal number of directors and 
representatives of shareholders subject to a ceiling of six 
persons. Equally, the 2011 SEC code specifies that at least 
one member of this committee must be a financial literate 
and should be able to read and understand the annual re-
port. Therefore we expect a positive relationship between 
audit committee variables and audit quality.
In summary, the models to be tested in this study as 
expressed in econometric forms are given in equations (4) 
and (5) below
 AQUALit = β0 + β1 ACSIZEit + β2 ACMTit +  
 β3 ACEXPit + eit ; (4)
 AQUALit = a0 + a1 ACEFTit + mit, (5)
where:
AQUALit = Audit quality for i firm at period t [Captured 
using a dichotomous variable of one (1) if company auditor 
is a Big 4 and zero (0) if otherwise (Ilaboya and Ohiokha 
2014)].
ACSIZEit = Audit committee size for i firm at period t 
[captured using the specific number as required by law: one 
(1) if size is 6, and zero (0) if otherwise].
ACMTit = Audit committee meetings for i firm at period 
t [assigned one (1) if meetings are held at least, quarterly, 
and zero (0) if not (Barua et al. 2010)].
ACEXPit = Audit committee financial expertise for i 
firm at period t [captured using absolute number of audit 
committee members having accounting or finance experience 
(Emeh and Appah 2013)].
ACEFTit = Audit committee effectiveness for i firm at 
period t [using a similar approach in Krishnan (2005), we 
captured ACEFT using the 4 commonly used audit commit-
tee characteristics: independence, size, expertise, and meet-
ings. The sum of these variables measured dichotomously 
signifies the level of effectiveness]. 
β0, β1, β2, β3, a0, a1 = Coefficient of variables. 
Aprior expectations: β1>1, β2>1, β3>1, a1>1.
Based on the nature of the dependent variable (audit 
quality) which is captured using a dummy of 1 and 0, the 
specified model is analyzed using the binary regression 
technique, as the classical regression technique will not be 
suited for a dichotomous dependent variable. We assume 
that the cumulative distribution follows a standard nor-
mal distribution thus; the probit form of binary regression 
technique is used. 
2. Results and interpretations
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the variables used 
in this study. The mean value for Audit quality (AQUAL) is 
0.61 suggesting that more than half of the sampled compa-
nies employ the services of the Big 4 audit firms. Based on 
this, we may infer that the extent of audit quality is slightly 
above average for the sampled firms. The mean for Audit 
committee size (ACSIZE) is 0.72 indicating that 72% of 
firms complied with the size criteria specified by CAMA 
(2004 as amended) by having exactly six (6) on the audit 
committee board. Similarly, the 0.62 that represents the 
mean for Audit committee meetings (ACMT) indicates 
that 62% of firms have at least, 4 meetings in a year. On the 
average, (ACEXP) having a mean of 1.28 implies that the 
number of financial experts present on audit committee 
boards is majorly 1 out of the 6-member board. Similarly, 
the mean for Audit committee effectiveness (ACEFT) stood 
at 2.49, signaling that the summary score for effectiveness 
of audit committee lies between 2 and 3. This shows that 
audit committee boards are averagely effective. 
As regards the dispersion and normality of the indi-
vidual variables, the small standard deviations suggest that 
actual values of individual firms are minimally dispersed 
from the mean, while the significance of the p-values of the 
Jarque-Bera statistics infer normality except for ACEFT that 
is not normally distributed. When compared against figure 
3 (histogram), the p-value of the JB statistics shows that the 
series taken jointly is normally distributed. The skewness 
of –0.44 indicates that the series is skewed towards the left. 
The kurtosis of 1.50 signals a distribution that is flat and not 
peaked. In summary, the normality test has been passed by 
the distribution and it is safe to assume that the distribution 
follows a normal curve.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
AQUAL ACSIZE ACMT ACEXP ACEFT
Mean  0.613333  0.720000  0.626667  1.280000  2.493333
Std. Dev.  0.488618  0.450503  0.485310  0.450503  0.817154
Jarque-Bera  25.29334  30.76381  25.47031  30.76381  4.118265
Probability  0.000003  0.000000  0.000003  0.000000  0.127565
Source: Researchers compilation (2016)
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Figure 3. Distribution Histogram. Source: Researchers compilation 2016
Table 2. Correlation Matrix
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary
Correlation Probability AQUAL ACSIZE ACMT ACEXP ACEFT
AQUAL 1.000000
ACSIZE 
0.236597
(0.0036)
1.000000
ACMT 
0.151324
(0.0645)
0.255400
(0.0016)
1.000000
ACEXP 
0.129274
(0.1149)
0.223545
(0.0060)
0.112965
(0.1687)
1.000000
ACEFT
0.245635
(0.0024)
0.687676
0.0000
0.738317
(0.0000)
0.223878
(0.0059)
1.000000
Source: Researchers compilation (2016)
Table 3. Model 1
Dependent Variable: AQUAL
Method: ML – Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C –0.555090 0.350526 –1.583589 0.1133
ACSIZE 0.548264 0.244573 2.241713 0.0250
ACMT 0.250586 0.224824 1.114590 0.2650
ACEXP 0.237241 0.248177 0.955937 0.3391
McFadden R-squared 0.052561     Mean dependent var 0.613333
S.D. dependent var 0.488618     S.E. of regression 0.475937
Akaike info criterion 1.317660     Sum squared resid 33.07133
Schwarz criterion 1.397944     Log likelihood –94.82453
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.350277     Deviance 189.6491
Restr. Deviance 200.1701     Restr. log likelihood –100.0851
LR statistic 10.52105     Avg. log likelihood –0.632164
Prob(LR statistic) 0.014619
Obs with Dep = 0 58      Total obs 150
Obs with Dep =1 92
Source: Researchers compilation (2016)
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The correlation matrix as seen in Table 2 is used to show 
the strength of the relationship between the variables. The 
strength of the relationship between AQUAL and ACSIZE is 
weak (0.23, p < 0.05), between AQUAL and ACMT is weak 
(0.15, p < 0.05), between AQUAL and ACEXP is poor (0.15, 
p > 0.05) and between AQUAL and ACEFT is also weak 
(0.24, p < 0.05). Looking at the interrelationship between 
the independent variables, all the variables are strongly re-
lated to ACEFT. This is expected since Audit committee 
effectiveness (ACEFT) is a summary score of the individual 
variables. Therefore, to avoid bias and multicollinearity is-
sues in the result, (ACEFT) will be regressed alone against 
Audit quality (AQUAL) for testing the last hypothesis. 
Table (3) is the estimation of model 1. Looking at the 
individual statistics of the variables, the Z statistics and as-
sociated p-values explain the significance or otherwise the 
association between the dependent and the independent 
variables. ACSIZE has a statistics of (2.24, p = 0.02). This 
outcome indicates that Audit committee size (ACSIZE) is 
significantly associated with Audit quality (AQUAL). The 
coefficient of 0.54 implies that the association is positive. 
Also, findings as depicted in Table (3) shows that audit 
committee meetings (ACMT) has a statistics value of (1.11, 
p = 0.26). This result implies that the positive association 
between ACMT and AQUAL is not significant. Similarly, 
result on the association between audit committee financial 
expertise (ACEXP) and Audit quality (AQUAL) as depicted 
in table (3), presents a statistics value of (0.95, p = 0.33). 
This outcome invariably implies that the positive associa-
tion between ACEXP and AQUAL is also not significant. 
In summary, at 5% significance level, audit committee 
size (ACSIZE has a significant positive relationship with 
Table 4. Goodness of Fit (model 1)
Goodness-of-Fit Evaluation for Binary Specification
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Tests
Equation: UNTITLED
H-L Statistic 12.8923 Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.1156
Andrews Statistic 22.2599 Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.0138
Source: Researchers compilation (2016)
AQUAL while ACMT and ACEXP have insignificant posi-
tive relationships with AQUAL. The McFadden R-squared 
shows that ACSIZE, ACMT, and ACEXP jointly explain 
about 5% of the systematic variation in AQUAL. The LR 
statistics of 10.52 and the associated p-value of 0.01 provide 
evidence that the model is statistically significant and sound 
in explaining the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables.
Table 4 provides evidence of the goodness of fit of model 
1 and therefore, serves as backing for the reliance of the sta-
tistics of the model. When the p-values are less than 0.05, it 
suggest that the model provides a line that is sufficiently fit-
ted. Looking at table 4, the HL statistics has a p-value that is 
greater than 0.05 while the Andrews statistics has a p–value 
that is less than 0.05. This mix finding suggests that caution 
be made in interpreting the result of the model estimation.
Table (5) is the estimation of model 2. ACEFT has a sta-
tistics of (2.96, p = 0.003). These show that it is significantly 
associated with AQUAL. The coefficient of 0.39 also shows 
that this association is positive. Therefore, at 5% significance 
level, ACEFT has a significant positive relationship with 
AQUAL. The McFadden R-squared shows that ACEFT ex-
plain about 4% of the systematic variation in AQUAL. The 
Table 5. Model 2
Dependent Variable: AQUAL
Method: ML – Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C –0.675449 0.340666 –1.982730 0.0474
ACEFT 0.390803 0.131744 2.966385 0.0030
McFadden R-squared 0.045402     Mean dependent var 0.613333
S.D. dependent var 0.488618     S.E. of regression 0.474692
Akaike info criterion 1.300547     Sum squared resid 33.34926
Schwarz criterion 1.340689     Log likelihood –95.54101
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.316855     Deviance 191.0820
Restr. Deviance 200.1701     Restr. log likelihood –100.0851
LR statistic 9.088085     Avg. log likelihood –0.636940
Prob(LR statistic) 0.002573
Obs with Dep=0 58      Total obs 150
Obs with Dep=1 92
Source: Researchers compilation (2016)
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LR statistics of 9.08 and associated p-value of 0.002 provide 
evidence that the model is statistically significant and sound 
in explaining the relationship between ACEFT and AQUAL.
Table 6 provides evidence of the goodness of fit of mod-
el 2. The HL statistics and Andrews statistics have p-values 
that are greater than 0.05 but less than 0.10. Thus, at 10% 
significance, the fitness of the model shows that reliance 
can be placed on the result. 
3. Hypotheses and discussions
The decision rule to test the hypotheses is that at 5% si-
gnificance level, we fail to accept the null hypothesis and 
accept the alternate, if the probability value of the z-sta-
tistics is less than 0.05 or vice versa. Based on the result as 
presented in Table 3, ACSIZE has a p-value that is less than 
0.05 consequently, the study accept the alternate hypothesis 
that ACSIZE has a significant positive relationship with 
AQUAL. This finding shows that an audit committee with 
a size of 6 as specified by the law helps to improve audit 
quality. Thus, the recommendation by CAMA (2004 as 
amended) has been validated empirically to be reliable. 
This finding further confirms the critical mass theory and 
proves that a committee size of 6 is enough to cause a posi-
tive impact on audit quality. This finding also supports the 
earlier findings of Lin et al. (2006) but negates the findings 
of Bedard et al. (2004). Also, findings as indicted in Table 3, 
indicates that ACMT has an insignificant relationship with 
AQUAL although the relationship is positive. This shows 
that a committee that meets at least 4 times in a year can 
aid audit quality, but the extent of its impact may not be 
significant or consequential. The insignificant nature of 
this finding may be hinged on the qualification of members 
who attend. If committee members meet regularly but lack 
requisite skills or qualifications, such meetings may prove 
useless and thus inconsequential. This may account for the 
insignificant finding when compared with the insignificant 
finding of audit committee expertise. This finding contra-
dicts the finding of Bedard et al. (2004) but supports the 
finding of Xie et al. (2003).
The result from Table 3 also shows that ACEXP has an 
insignificant relationship with AQUAL though the relation-
ship is positive. What this implies is that as the quality of 
expertise of audit committee members increase, so does 
the quality of audit. The implication of this finding on the 
requirement of the 2011 SEC code is that having at least one 
member of the audit committee as a financial expert will aid 
audit quality but the impact of this is not significant. Thus, 
experts on audit committee boards may or may not cause 
quality audit. This outcome may be due to the work nature 
of audit committee members. It is possible that even with 
the requirement of having at least one expert in accounting 
and finance as an audit committee member, such member 
may be belabored with so much responsibilities that rob 
such member of efficiency. Furthermore, the insignificant 
nature of this finding may be due to the lack of clarity on 
the definition of an expert. According to Dhaliwal et al. 
(2006), a financial expert may be an expert in accounting 
or finance or general business. The impact of these types of 
experts will ordinarily be different. Thus, the insignificant 
nature of this finding may be due to the quality of experts 
as this was captured using the definition specified by 2011 
SEC code. This finding also supports the earlier findings of 
Aronmwan et al. (2013), Omoye and Aronmwan (2013) 
but negates the findings of Madawaki and Amran (2013).
Lastly, Table 5 shows that audit committee effectiveness 
has a significant and positive relationship with audit quality. 
The Blue Ribbon committee advocated that effectiveness 
of audit committee is key in improving audit quality. This 
finding provides empirical evidence to support the commit-
tee’s recommendation. Audit effectiveness was measured 
as a summary score of having an audit committee of 6 that 
meets at least 4 times in a year, having at least an accounting 
or finance expert and is equally independent. Based on this 
measure, findings from this study shows that such commit-
tee would aid audit quality more than a committee that lacks 
any of the requirements. This finding aligns with general 
findings in this area. It specifically aligns with the findings 
of Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011), Bedard et al., (2004) 
and Xie et al. (2003). 
Based on the findings, this study therefore recommends 
that: The requirement of having a 6-member audit com-
mittee is sound and empirically proven to aid audit quality. 
Therefore, firms yet to subscribe to these should hasten up 
and sanctions be made for firms that do not. The insignifi-
cant finding on the number of meetings shows that it is not a 
major requirement for effectiveness of the audit committee. 
Thus, there is no need to make a strict requirement in this 
regards as it was done for the board of directors and audit 
committees should freely meet based on the circumstances 
faced by individual firms. The significant positive nature 
of audit committee effectiveness show that four attributes 
jointly account for effectiveness vis independence, size 
(6), meetings (at least quarterly) and expertise (at least 1). 
Therefore, firms are encouraged to establish audit commit-
tees that have all these attributes if audit quality must be 
encouraged.
Table 6. Goodness of Fit (model 2)
Goodness-of-Fit Evaluation for Binary Specification
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Tests
Equation: UNTITLED
H-L Statistic 13.8787 Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.0850
Andrews Statistic 16.0734 Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.0976
Source: Researchers compilation (2016)
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Conclusion
Having examined audit committees in Nigeria and bench-
marked their attributes to the requirements of the 2011 SEC 
code, we conclude based on the positive relationship of all 
the variables examined that the requirements as specified 
in the code indeed adds to audit quality. More importantly, 
based on the significance of audit committee effectiveness 
which is dependent on the presence of other audit com-
mittee attributes, we conclude that regulatory bodies such 
as Security and Exchange Commission, Nigerian Stock 
Exchange and others should make it mandatory for com-
panies to meet these minimum audit committee attribute 
requirements if audit quality must be at a high standard. 
Limitations/Future research
The insight provided by this study notwithstanding, this 
research has limitations which would motivate further re-
search. Future research could investigate other audit com-
mittee attributes such as gender or even the specific nature 
of expertise (accounting or finance or business).
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